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A series of five experiments examined how the evaluation of a scientific finding was
influenced by information about the number of studies that had successfully replicated
the initial finding. The experiments also tested the impact of frame (negative, positive) and
numeric format (percentage, natural frequency) on the evaluation of scientific findings.
In Experiments 1 through 4, an attitude difference score served as the dependent
measure, while a measure of choice served as the dependent measure in Experiment
5. Results from a diverse sample of 188 non-institutionalized U.S. adults (Experiment
2) and 730 undergraduate college students (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) indicated that
attitudes became more positive as the replication rate increased and attitudes were more
positive when the replication information was framed positively. The results also indicate
that the manner in which replication rate was framed had a greater impact on attitude
than the replication rate itself. The large effect for frame was attenuated somewhat when
information about replication was presented in the form of natural frequencies rather
than percentages. A fifth study employing 662 undergraduate college students in a task
in which choice served as the dependent measure confirmed the framing effect and
replicated the replication rate effect in the positive frame condition, but provided no
evidence that the use of natural frequencies diminished the effect.
Keywords: framing, natural frequencies, probability judgments, public perception of science, replication,
representation of information
INTRODUCTION
“The gold standard for reliability is independent replication.”
–Frank and Saxe (2012).
“Even 100 failures in a row to replicate, following statistical significance, will not impugn the original
decision to reject H0 and affirm H1.”
–Sohn (1998).
Science journalists may announce that a particular substance causes cancer, only to announce a
few weeks or months later that subsequent studies failed to confirm the earlier finding. The public
may be informed that a new drug treats a particular disorder safely, only to be told that further
research indicates that the drug is either not safe or not effective (or both). After the findings of
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an initial study have been made public, science journalists
might report that subsequent studies have replicated or, more
likely, failed to replicate the initial results. How are members
of the general public, who are regularly bombarded with
conflicting scientific reports, influenced by this information?
This paper will present several studies that investigate how
information about research replication rates (the percentage of
attempted replications of a study that succeeded in replicating
the study) impact non-scientists’ attitudes about science claims.
Furthermore, the current studies investigate how the format in
which replication rate information is presented can influence
attitudes.
Many scientists feel that replication is a critical component
of science (e.g., Ioannidis and Khoury, 2011; Santer et al.,
2011; Tomasello and Call, 2011). Commonly touted benefits of
replication include the ability to detect bias and random error
(Bayarri and Berger, 1991), the ability to eliminate investigator
error (Cohen, 1997) and Type 1 error as explanations for research
results, and the creation of a cumulative body of work (Fowler,
1995). The importance of replication has been emphasized by
some as a reaction to claims that a large proportion of scientific
findings, are false positives (Ioannidis, 2005; see also Risch,
2000; Sterne and Davey Smith, 2001; Hirschhorn et al., 2002;
Wacholder et al., 2004; Simmons et al., 2011).
The concept of replication is discussed in the mass media
and information regarding replications (and failed replications)
therefore has the potential to influence popular opinion
regarding scientific claims. For instance, the media informed the
general public about failures to replicate Pons and Fleischmann’s
cold fusion results (Browne, 1989), Andrew Wakefield’s autism
results (Boseley, 2010), Benveniste’s water memory results
(Sullivan, 1988), and the finding that the XMRV retrovirus
was associated with chronic fatigue syndrome (Tuller, 2011).
A widely disseminated New Yorker article aimed at a non-
scientist audience (Leher, 2010) frankly addressed issues such as
replicability and the file drawer effect.
The present studies were not designed to answer the question
of how (or whether) confidence in a finding should be modified
based on the outcome of replication efforts. Rather the present
goal is descriptive: we wish to find out how knowledge about
replication efforts affects themanner in which non-scientists alter
their confidence in research findings. Many non-scientists lack a
firm grasp of scientific and research methods, so we have no clear
expectation of the amount of influence replication information
will have on lay persons. However, we can generate the more
conservative hypothesis that non-scientists are impacted by
knowledge of replication in such a way that knowledge of a
failed replication of a study will cause lay persons to reduce their
confidence in that study.
When people make decisions under conditions of uncertainty,
the framing of the information can influence their decisions
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Levin et al., 1998; Gong et al.,
2013). Broadly speaking, framing effects are revealed when the
wording used to describe a given piece of information has an
impact on the choices and decisions individuals make. Framing
effects have been demonstrated to affect choice, attitude, and
behavior in a wide range of tasks, but not all framing studies
explore the same phenomenon. Levin et al. (1998) include
three types of framing in their typology: risky choice, goal, and
attribute. In attribute framing, the dependent measure of interest
is the evaluation of a single option (e.g., whether-or-not a claim
is true) rather than a choice between independent options (e.g.,
whether-or-not one option is preferable to another), therefore the
framing paradigm used in the present studies is an example of
attribute framing. A consistent finding in the attribute framing
literature is that a particular alternative is rated more favorably
when described positively than when described negatively (Davis
and Bobko, 1986).
In the attribute framing literature (see Sher and McKenzie,
2006 for a review), researchers sometimes claim that two
different frames contain logically equivalent information (i.e.,
contain the same logical content). Cases where both frames
contain logically equivalent information may not be equivalent
in other crucial aspects, however. Some of the mechanisms
proposed to explain attribute framing are concerned with the
ways that differently framed statements are nonequivalent. The
first possibility (Sher and McKenzie, 2006) is that two different
logically equivalent frames may be informationally inequivalent
because of information leakage: the communicator’s choice
of frame may contain information (e.g., the choice that the
communicator favors) and this leaked information may be
detected by the recipient of the communication (McKenzie and
Nelson, 2003; Sher and McKenzie, 2006). The second possibility
is that people interpret “60% replication rate” to mean “at least
60% have succeeded in replicating” and interpret “40% failure
to replicate” to mean “at least 40% have failed to replicate”
(Macdonald, 1986; Mandel, 2001). A third explanation of the
attribute framing effect relies on the notion that people are
sensitive to the descriptive valence of the words employed. Levin
and Gaeth (1988) have argued that an attribute described with
a positive label evokes favorable associations in memory, while
an attribute described with a negative label evokes unfavorable
associations in memory.
Not only do those who intend to communicate replication
rate information to others have a choice of frame (positive,
negative) they also have a choice of numeric format. The claim
“10 studies attempted to replicate finding X, and 6 succeeded” is
presented in terms of natural frequencies (Hoffrage et al., 2002).
Another important characteristic of natural frequencies is that
the total sample size and number of cases in a given subset are
both transparent. When the same information is converted to
probability (0.6) or percentage (60%), the number of cases in
the subset and the total sample size are no longer available. So,
proportion and percentage retain only one out of three piece of
information found in the natural frequencies.
Natural frequencies have been compared with probabilities
in the context of the debate concerning Bayesian reasoning
(Gigerenzer, 1996; Kahneman and Tversky, 1996). Some have
claimed that, due to their evolutionary heritage, humans have a
natural predisposition to think in terms of natural frequencies
(Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1996;
Brase et al., 1998; Hoffrage et al., 2000). Replacing probabilities
with natural frequencies tends to minimize a number of biases
(Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Koehler et al., 1994). Slovic
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et al. (2000) found that risk estimates were impacted by numeric
format (probabilities vs. natural frequencies) and Purchase and
Slovic (1999) found that when risks are small, presenting them
in terms of frequency rather than proportion or percent has a
tendency to alarm people. Regardless of the theoretical value of
themanipulation, there is a simple practical reason for presenting
participants with probability information in both percentage
and natural frequency formats: if the format that probability
information is presented in interacts with information about
replication rate, then knowledge of this effect would be of use to
producers and consumers of science information.
Note that in the English language one generally does
not substitute “no percent” for “0%” or “all percent” for
“100%.” When using natural frequencies, however, an individual
sometimes has the option to use either Arabic numerals or verbal
descriptors to specify the quantity of a subcategory. For instance,
a particular situation could be described with the phrase “0 of the
5 studies replicated the effect” or the phrase “none of the 5 studies
replicated the effect.” These two phrases are mathematically
(and informationally) equivalent, so one might predict that
they would be psychologically equivalent as well. As Feynman
(1967) has pointed out, however, mathematical equivalence is
not the same as psychological equivalence. Somewhat related
to this issue, there is extensive research exploring the unique
aspects of qualitative probability expressions and quantitative
probability values (Toogood, 1980; Beyth-Marom, 1982; Nakao
and Axelrod, 1983; Budescu and Wallsten, 1985; Mosteller
and Youtz, 1990). Qualitative probability expressions include
such verbal expressions as mostly, very likely, exceptionally
unlikely, and rare while quantitative probability values include
such numeric expressions as 90% likelihood and 1% likelihood.
Though this literature reveals that these two manners of
presenting probability information are not always interpreted
the same way by participants, it should be noted that, unlike
the natural frequency phrases given as an example above,
qualitative probability expressions are neither logically nor
mathematically equivalent to quantitative probability values.
Since Arabic numbers might have different psychological effects
than the use of qualitative terms, and both are found in media
reports on science, we will use both kinds of expressions in the
current study.
One of our major goals concerns a practical application; we
would like to determine how high the replication rate of a study
has to be before the knowledge about the replication rate will
actually cause an increase, rather than a decrease, in confidence
about that finding. Our second major goal is to determine if
replication rate affects participants in a way that is independent
of numeric format. Our third major goal is to determine what
effect, if any, the framing of replication rate information has on
attitudes. We have chosen attitude difference as the dependent
measure with which to achieve our research goals.
Our first hypothesis (H1) is that participants will be sensitive
to replication rate information. In the absence of a compelling
theoretical reason to expect a more complex geometrical trend, it
is our hypothesis that the relationship between attitude difference
scores and replication rate will be linear: higher replication
rates will be associated with more favorable attitudes toward the
claims. Given the findings reported in studies that employed an
attribute framing paradigm, our second hypothesis (H2) is that
the framing of the replication rate information will have at least as
strong an impact as the replication rate information itself. More
specifically, it is our hypothesis that positively framed replication
rates will lead to more favorable attitudes than negatively framed
replication rates. Our third hypothesis (H3) is that the framing
effect will be less pronounced when the numeric format of
replication rate information is in natural frequencies rather
than percentages. The third hypothesis is based on research
that indicates that human reasoning is facilitated by the use of
natural frequencies. Finally, it is our hypothesis (H4) that when
replication rate information is presented as natural frequencies,
the attitude difference will not depend on whether the natural
frequency is presented with Arabic numerals (e.g., 0 out of 10)
or words (e.g., none of the 10).
EXPERIMENT 1A
The goal of Experiment 1 was to test our first two hypotheses
using replication rate information in percentages. Thus,
replication rate information was presented in terms of
percentages and was framed in either a positive or negative
fashion. We predicted that increasingly larger replication rates
would be associated with more positive attitudes and that this
would be evidenced by a significant linear trend, with no other
significant trend components. We also predicted that negative
frames would lead to more negative attitudes than would positive
frames and the effect size associated with the framing effect
would be at least moderate in size.
Methods
Ethics Statement
Ethics approval for Studies 1 through 5 was obtained from
all institutions at which data was collected. These institutions
include Columbus State Community College (CSCC), Haverford
College (HC), Lafayette College (LC), Montana State University
(MSU), Salem State University (SSU), University of Cincinnati-
Clermont College (UCC), and The University of Houston (UH).
For Study 1, data was collected and IRB approval was granted
from CSCC, HC, SSU, and UH. For Study 2, IRB approval was
granted from Lafayette College. For Studies 3 and 4, data was
collected, and IRB approval was granted from CSCC, LC, and
UCC. For Study 5, data was collected, and IRB approval was
granted fromMSU and UCC.
In all cases a written information sheet or a computer screen
containing the information was provided to participants, but
the committees waived the need for written informed consent
from the participants as the research was low risk. Some minor
deception was necessary to test our hypotheses, participants’
rights and welfare were not adversely affected, and a full
debriefing was provided at the end of the study.
Participants
One hundred and eighty-three undergraduate students enrolled
in psychology courses volunteered to participate. Data from 11
participants were excluded because of failure to answer all the
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items in the questionnaire and/or failure to follow instructions.
Seventy-eight percent of the remaining 172 participants were
female. The age range for the sample was 18–49 and the
average age was 21.9. Seven participants were students at a
private liberal arts college, 119 were enrolled at a private
university, 11 were enrolled at a state college, and 35 were
enrolled at a community college. All participants were given
extra-credit in their psychology courses as compensation. The
stimuli, procedure, and primary dependent measure employed
in Experiments 1 through 4 were novel. For this reason, we
did not know what effect sizes would be likely to obtain. We
therefore aimed to recruit 100 participants per frame for each
experiment. Due to incomplete questionnaires and failure to
follow instructions the exact number of participants per was
never exactly 100. However, in all studies the decisions to
terminate data collection were always made prior to looking at
any of the data.
Stimuli and Procedure
Stimuli consisted of 24 science claims about topics that were
either fictions created by the authors or obscure topics that would
be unfamiliar to participants. Thus, the claims were designed to
function as the “blank predicates” that are commonly used by
psychologists interested in deductive reasoning. Twelve of the
claims were critical to this study (see Table S1) and the other
12 were distractor items that were included to keep participants
from determining the purpose of the study. The stimuli for
all experiments have been included in the Supplementary
Materials.
Additional information for the 12 critical items consisted of
the replication rate of studies that supported each initial claim
(see Tables S2, S3). The additional information was framed
in either a positive or negative fashion (a between-subjects
manipulation). Frame was chosen as a between-subjects variable
because we worried that if items on a given questionnaire
switched between positively and negatively framed information,
participants might be more likely to misread an item, and give
a response appropriate to the wrong frame. In the positive
frame condition, six replication rates (percentages of studies that
successfully replicated the results of an earlier study) were chosen
(9, 17, 24, 69, 77, and 84%); creating six potential versions of
additional information for each initial claim. In the negative
frame condition, six replication failure rates (percentages of
studies that failed to replicate the results of an earlier study)
were used (91, 83, 76, 31, 23, and 16%) creating six potential
versions of additional information for each initial claim. For a
given frame (positive, negative) and initial claim, the six related
pieces of additional information differed only in regards to the
percentage of successful replications reported. The additional
information created for distractor items did not include any
information regarding the replication (or lack thereof) of
scientific studies. Distractor items consisted of science claims that
contained additional supporting information that was unrelated
to replication rate.
Each participant was randomly assigned to complete 1 of
16 (8 positive framed, 8 negatively framed) paper and pencil
questionnaire variants (see Stimuli S1 for an example). Each
questionnaire variant contained 24 science claims: 12 distractor
items and 12 critical items. Six of the critical items were
science claims in isolation (baseline items) and six of the critical
items were science claims paired with additional information.
For each critical item, a questionnaire would include either
the baseline version of the item or the claim paired with
additional information but never both. As with the critical
items, 6 of the distractor items were science claims in isolation
and 6 of the distractor items were science claims paired
with additional information. Half of the questionnaire variants
contained replication rate presented in a positive frame and half
contained replication rate presented in a negative frame. In each
questionnaire the initial section of 24 science claims was followed
by several demographic questions.
The sequence of the 24 claims was randomized with the
constraint that no more than three distractor items or three
critical items could appear in a row. Additionally, no more
than two non-baseline items could appear in a row. Pairings
of critical items and replication rates was unique to each
questionnaire. For instance, if a 17% replication rate wasmatched
to science claim number 1 in variant 8, then none of the other
variants would pair science claim number 1 with that particular
replication rate.
After each science claim, respondents were presented with
an opportunity to indicate their attitude toward the claim
using a 6-point scale that ranged from strongly favor (1) to
strongly oppose (6). It was unlikely that participants would find
each of the critical science claims equally compelling, therefore
difference scores, rather than raw attitude scores, served as
the dependent measure. Had we used raw attitude scores, we
would not have been able to determine the unique contributions
of plausibility of the claim and information about replication
rate. We used the responses to the baseline items (critical
items not paired with additional information) to calculate mean
attitude scores for each of the 12 claims. For each critical
item paired with additional replication rate information trial,
the attitude score was subtracted from the mean score of the
appropriate critical claim in isolation (the mean baseline attitude
score). A negative difference scores indicates that participants
found a science claim to be less convincing when it was
followed by additional information. For instance, across all
participants presented with the baseline version of claim number
10, the average attitude was 3.1. If a participant responded
with a “4” on the 1–6 scale for claim 10 on a trial in
which the claim 10 was followed by additional information
about the percentage of studies that successfully replicated the
research upon which the claim was based, then that participant’s
difference score would be −0.9, indicating a shift away from the
average baseline attitude of nearly one integer on the 6 point
scale.
In this experiment, and all subsequent experiments, decisions
to terminate data collection were made before any data were
looked at. All of our studies, pilot studies, and conditions related
to the topic of replication rate have been reported. Over the
course of the current paper, all independent, and dependent
variables have been fully reported. That is, the authors have no
additional studies or data related to this topic in a “file drawer.”
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TABLE 1 | Mean and standard deviation of difference scores for
Experiments 1a and 1b.
Experiment Replication
rate (%)
Positive frame
M(SD)
Negative frame
M(SD)
1b 4 −0.577 (1.38)* −1.560 (1.33)*
1a 9 −0.397 (1.33)* −1.384 (1.39)*
1a 17 −0.193 (1.36) −1.367 (1.25)*
1a 24 −0.109 (1.33) −1.111 (1.39)*
1b 32 0.131 (1.30) −1.154 (1.07)*
1b 42 −0.066 (1.25) −1.056 (1.21)*
1b 54 0.151 (1.38) −0.755 (1.24)
1a 69 0.529 (1.34)* −0.055 (1.20)
1a 77 0.720 (1.50)* −0.236 (1.30)
1a 84 0.986 (1.19)* 0.139 (1.37)
1b 92 0.700 (1.46)* −0.189 (1.36)
1b 97 0.673 (1.36)* −0.003 (1.61)
*Indicates value that is significantly different from zero.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics for Experiment 1a are presented in Table 1
and the pattern of data for Experiment 1a is also presented
graphically in Figure 1 (Data Available from Montana State
University Scholarworks, https://doi.org/10.15788/M23014).
Preliminary analyses considering gender and age were conducted
on this experiment (and also Experiments 1b, 2, 3, and 4) revealed
no significant effects involving either gender or age (p > 0.19
across Experiments 1a, 1b, 2, 3, and 4). Due to these findings,
and because there were no theoretical reasons to expect that
the replication rate or framing effects would be influenced by
these variables, all reported analyses involve data in aggregate
form.
A 2 × 6 mixed factorial ANOVA of attitude difference scores
considering frame (positive, negative) as the between-subjects
factor and replication rate (9, 17, 24, 69, 77, 84%) as the within-
subjects factor revealed a significant main effect of frame, F(1, 170)
= 83.4, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.329, and a significant main effect of
replication rate, F(5, 850) = 41.1, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.195. There
was, however, no interaction between frame and replication rate
(p > 0.39). The lack of a significant interaction between frame
and replication rate indicated that the difference in the slopes
(reported in Table 2) between the two frame conditions was
not statistically significant. Further analysis of the main effect
of replication rate revealed a significant linear trend, F(1, 170)
= 124.8, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.423. Note that due to the large
number of participants in this and subsequent studies, it is
likely that a great number of analyses will yield significant
differences. Because of this problem, we will not report trend
analyses with effect sizes that are less than moderate (i.e.,
η
2
p < 0.06) as we feel that they have no have any practical
meaning. For each replication rate, a single sample t-test was
conducted to compare the difference score to zero. Here (and
elsewhere) we used the Bonferroni correction to maintain the
family-wise error rate at 0.05, and the results can be seen in
Table 1.
FIGURE 1 | Difference score as a function of frame for Experiments 1a
and 1b. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Because themean attitude change values for the six replication
rates reflected a strong linear trend, it was possible to calculate
the replication rate associated with no change in attitude by
determining the line of best fit through the mean values of the
six attitude difference scores for each frame. Some readers may
find this calculation useful, as it makes transparent the relative
influence of framing and replication rate. This information may
be more interesting to science journalists and researchers in
the field of science communication than to researchers in the
field of judgment and decision making (JDM). When calculating
the line of best fit through the mean difference scores for
each frame (positive, negative) replication rate was assigned to
the x axis and attitude difference to the y axis, as depicted
in Figure 1. The resulting equations for the lines of best fit,
the x intercept, y intercept and slope values for Experiment
1a (as well as Experiments 1b, 2, 3, and 4) are presented in
Table 2. The x intercept is the point at which knowledge of
the replication rate has no effect on attitude. Values on the x
axis above this level are associated with increasingly favorable
attitudes toward science claims, while values below this level are
associated with increasingly negative attitudes toward science
claims. The slope represents the degree to which participants
are sensitive to replication rate information. A slope of 0 would
obtain if participants did not revise their attitudes about a
science claim at all in the face of information regarding the
percentage of studies that had successfully replicated the finding
upon which the claim was based. While the slopes calculated
for each of the two frames in Experiment 1a are different, the
difference is not statistically significant, as indicated by the non-
significant interaction between frame and replication rate. The
impact of the framing of the information (positive, negative)
can be described in two ways. The difference scores in the
positive condition were more positive than those in the negative
condition (n = 96, M = 0.256 and n = 76, M = −0.669,
respectively). Described in this way, framing the information in
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive Statistics for Experiments 1a, 1b, 2, 3, and 4.
Experiment Frame Equation X intercept Y intercept Slope
1a Positive y′ = 0.0167x−0.521 31.3 −0.521 0.0167
Negative y′ = 0.0205x−1.627 79.4 −1.627 0.0205
1b Positive y′ = 0.0129x−0.523 40.4 −0.523 0.0129
Negative y′ = 0.0165x−1.673 100 −1.673 0.0166
1a and 1b combined Positive y′ = 0.0143x−0.506 35.3 −0.506 0.0143
Negative y′ = 0.0179x−1.626 90.7 −1.626 0.0179
2 Positive y′ = 0.0117x−0.605 51.8 −0.605 0.0117
Negative y′ = 0.0143x−1.363 95.5 −1.363 0.0143
3 Positive y′ = 0.0198x−1.167 59.1 −1.167 0.0198
Negative y′ = 0.0099x−0.936 97.5 −0.936 0.0098
4 Positive y′ = 0.0149x−0.768 51.6 −0.768 0.0149
Negative y′ = 0.01436−1.29 90.5 −1.29 0.0143
For the purpose of calculating these equations all replication rate information was converted to proportions.
a negative fashion leads (on average) to a difference score 0.925
lower than that expected in the positive condition. The other
way of describing the impact of the frame is to compare the x
intercept values for the two frame conditions. The x intercept
for the positive frame condition is 31.3 while the x intercept for
the negative condition is 79.4. This means that when replication
rate information is framed in a positive manner, replication rates
greater than 31.3% will lead to an increase in favorable attitude
toward the claim upon which the research was based. In contrast,
when the information is framed negatively, replication rates
would have to exceed 79.4% (i.e., 21% or less failed to replicate)
before individuals would adopt a more favorable attitude toward
the claim.
Experiment 1a confirmed several of our hypotheses. First,
the experiment revealed that non-scientists (i.e., students) make
use of replication rate information in developing attitudes about
science claims. The results also indicate that the relationship
between attitude difference and replication rate is roughly linear
(H1). That is, attitudes toward a claim increase as a simple linear
function of the percentage of attempted replications that were
successful. As measured by partial eta-squared, the effect size for
frame was even stronger than the effect size for replication rate,
indicating that the framing of the information has a very strong
impact on attitude (H2).
EXPERIMENT 1B
The six replication rate values employed in Experiment 1a
were not evenly spaced and therefore resulted in a number of
large gaps. In order to provide a clearer picture of participant
response to replication rate information, in Experiment 1b
we repeated Experiment 1a using new replication rate values.
The values in Experiment 1b were chosen for their ability
to “close up” the gaps in the values used in Experiment 1a.
As in Experiment 1a percentages that could represent simple
ratios (e.g., 25 and 50%) were avoided so that the replication
rate would imply that a large number of replications were
attempted.
Methods
Participants
Two hundred and thirteen undergraduate students enrolled in
psychology courses volunteered to participate. Data from 17
participants were excluded because of failure to answer all the
items in the questionnaire and failure to follow instructions. One
hundred and sixty of the remaining 196 participants were female.
The age range for the sample was 18–48 and the average age was
22.2. Thirty participants were enrolled at a private liberal arts
college, 109 were enrolled at a private university, 20 were enrolled
at a state college and 37 were enrolled at a community college. All
participants were given extra-credit in their psychology courses
as compensation.
Stimuli and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure of Experiment 1b was identical
to Experiment 1a with the exception that a different set of
replication rate/replication failure rate values were employed.
The eight questionnaires presenting replication rate information
in a positive frame used six different percentages (4, 32,
42, 54, 92, and 97%) specifying the number of studies that
successfully replicated a finding. The eight questionnaires
presenting replication rate information in a negative frame
employed the corresponding percentages (96, 68, 58, 46, 8, and
3%) specifying the number of studies that failed to replicate a
particular finding.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics for Experiment 1b are presented in Table 1
and the pattern of data for Experiment 1b is also presented
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graphically in Figure 1. A 2 × 6 mixed factorial ANOVA of
attitude difference scores considering frame (positive, negative)
as the between-subjects factor and replication rate (4, 32, 42, 54,
92, 97%) as the within-subjects factor revealed a significant main
effect of frame, F(1, 194) = 91.7, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.321, and a
significant main effect of replication rate, F(5, 970) = 35, p< 0.001,
η
2
p = 0.153. There was, however, no interaction between frame
and replication rate (p> 0.3). The lack of a significant interaction
between frame and replication rate indicated that the difference
in the slopes for each of the two conditions was not statistically
significant. Further analysis of the main effect of replication rate
indicated a significant linear trend, F(1, 194) = 97.5, p < 0.001, η
2
p
= 0.334.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiments 1a and 1b both confirmed the predictions that
attitude in relationship to science claims will be linearly related to
replication rate (H1) and that the framing of this information will
have a big impact (H2). Though the two experiments employed
a non-overlapping set of replication rate values, the pattern of
results in the two parts of Experiment 1 were very similar to one
another. A common criticism of psychological research is that the
samples employed in many of the studies are not representative
of the population. In regards to Experiments 1a and 1b, this is
a valid criticism: the impact of replication rate information and
framing on the general population is more interesting than its
impact on college students enrolled in introductory psychology
courses. In order to address this issue, Experiment 2 was a near-
replication of Experiments 1a and 1b using a diverse sample
of non-institutionalized U.S. adults above the age of 24. We
gathered additional demographic information from participants
in Experiment 2 in order to determine if replication rate and
framing effects varied as a function of age, education level,
income, or self-reported scientific knowledge.
Though many of the participants in Experiment 2 had
no college experience, it was predicted that participants in
Experiment 2 would, in general, respond to replication rate
information in much the same way as the undergraduate college
students sampled in Experiments 1a and 1b. It may be that the
term “replication” is not well understood by participants with
less education or participants with a lower self-reported scientific
knowledge. If this is so, then the replication rate effect might
be smaller for these participants. However, we are not aware
of any studies that show that framing effects are enhanced or
attenuated among college students compared to other segments
of the population, so we predict that the strong framing effect
found in Experiment 1 would be demonstrated in Experiment 2.
Methods
Participants
Two-hundred and twenty-four participants were recruited
through an opt-in internet panel managed by a survey research
firm (Marketing Systems Group). Data from 22 participants
were excluded because the participants completed the survey
in <4min. Data from 14 additional respondents was excluded
for failure to answer all the non-demographic items or failure
to follow instructions. The remaining participants comprised
188 non-institutionalized adults living in the U.S. The age of
respondents ranged from 25 to 83 with a mean of 48.8 and
median of 47. Thirty-nine states were represented in the sample
and 78 of the respondents were female. Seventy-nine percent
of the respondents identified themselves as non-Hispanic white,
while 10.1, 8.5, 1.6, and 0.5% identified themselves as black,
Hispanic, Asian, and Native American respectively. Additionally,
47.3% of respondents had earned at least one college degree, and
49.2% of the respondents were from households with an annual
income below $50 k per year. All participants were paid $2.75 for
their participation.
Stimuli and Procedure
Care was taken to make sure that the on-line questionnaires
were as similar as possible to the earlier paper and pencil
questionnaires. The stimuli and procedure of Experiment 2
were identical to Experiment 1a with three exceptions. The
16 questionnaire variants created for Experiment 2 contained
a more extensive set of demographic questions. Additionally,
the questionnaires in Experiment 2 were administered via
the internet using Opinio software. In Experiment 2, the
questionnaires presenting replication rate information in a
positive frame employed six different percentages (4, 17, 42,
69, 84, 97%) specifying the number of studies that successfully
replicated a finding. The six percentages were selected from
among the set of 12% used in Experiments 1a and 1b and were
selected with the goal of choosing values that were evenly spaced.
The eight questionnaires presenting replication rate information
in a negative frame employed the corresponding percentages (96,
83, 58, 31, 16, 3%) specifying the number of studies that failed to
replicate a particular finding.
Several demographic questions followed the presentation of
the science claims and responses to these questions were used
to categorize participants. In terms of the variable of age,
participants were grouped into either the young category (age 25–
47, n = 93) or old category (age 48+, n = 94). In terms of the
variable education, participants were categorized on the basis of
whether they had (n= 89) or had not (n= 99) earned a bachelor’s
degree. In terms of the variable knowledge, participants were
categorized based on how much knowledge they felt they had in
regards to science. The low knowledge group (n= 120) included
all participants that indicated that they were either not very
knowledgeable or somewhat knowledgeable about science and
the high knowledge group (n= 68) included all participants who
indicated that they were either moderately knowledgeable or very
knowledgeable about science. In terms of the variable income,
participants were grouped into either the low income category
(<$50 k/yr, n = 92) or the high income category ($50 k/yr or
more, n= 95).
Results and Discussion
As with Experiments 1a, 1b, 3, and 4, preliminary analyses
involving age and gender were conducted for Experiment 1.
In addition to those analyses, we also conducted analyses of
knowledge, income, and education. The preliminary analyses for
Experiment 2 revealed no significant effects involving any of
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TABLE 3 | Mean and standard deviation of difference scores for
Experiment 2.
Replication rate (%) Positive frame M(SD) Negative frame M(SD)
4 −0.608 (1.42)* −1.174 (1.50)*
17 −0.271 (1.27) −1.141 (1.30)*
42 −0.271 (1.29) −0.871 (1.17)*
69 0.252 (1.28) −0.509 (1.96)*
84 0.476 (1.36)* −0.222 (1.38)
97 0.454 (1.55) 0.210 (1.30)
*Indicates value that is significantly different from zero.
FIGURE 2 | Difference score as a function of frame for Experiment 2.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
these five subject variables (p > 0.21 in all cases). Therefore,
we report analyses of the data in aggregate form. Descriptive
statistics for Experiment 2 are presented in Table 3 and the
pattern of data for Experiment 2 is presented graphically in
Figure 2. A 2 × 6 mixed factorial ANOVA considering frame
(positive, negative) as the between-subjects factor and replication
rate (4, 17, 42, 69, 84, 97%) as the within-subjects factor revealed
a significant main effect of frame, F(1, 186) = 36.2, p < 0.001,
η
2
p = 0.163, and a significant main effect of replication rate,
F(5, 970) = 29.1, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.135. There was, however, no
interaction between frame and replication rate (p > 0.2). The
lack of a significant interaction between frame and replication
rate indicated that the difference in the slopes for each of the two
conditions was not statistically significant. Further analysis of the
main effect of replication rate revealed a significant linear trend,
F(1, 186) = 85.4, p< 0.001, η
2
p = 0.315.
Even though the samples included in Experiments 1 and
2 were very different, the results of both studies paint a very
consistent picture: replication rate and framing both have a
strong impact on attitude. Note also that a different set of six
replication rates were employed in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2,
indicating that the pattern of results is not due to an artifact
related to a particular set of replication rates chosen.
EXPERIMENT 3
Some have suggested that humans are better able to process
information when it is presented in the format of natural
frequencies (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Cosmides and
Tooby, 1996). To address this possibility, in Experiment 3 the
replication rate information was presented in the form of natural
frequencies (e.g., “4 of the 10 studies that attempted to replicate
the findings succeeded in doing so”). Throughout Experiment 3
the total number of attempted replications was always 10. Note
that the replication rates employed in the earlier studies (e.g.,
97%) implied that far more than 10 research teams attempted
to replicate each finding. In general, the natural frequencies
reported in Experiment 3 used Arabic numerals (e.g., 4 of 10). As
we constructed the stimuli, however, we noticed that the phrases
“0 out of 10” and “10 out of 10” could be awkward and unnatural.
We therefore replaced Arabic numerals with words in some of
the 0 of 10 and 10 of 10 versions of the stimuli.
One goal of Experiment 3 was to determine if changing
the format in which the replication rate is presented would
have any impact on attitude (H3). Due to the fact that natural
frequencies are easier to work with and result in fewer reasoning
“errors,” it was our hypothesis that the framing effects seen in
Experiments 1 and 2 would be attenuated in Experiment 3. Let
us assume that the more dubious a finding is, the greater the
number of research teams will attempt to replicate the effect.
Since the studies described in Experiment 3 only resulted in 10
research teams attempting replication while the studies reported
in Experiments 1 and 2 involved much larger numbers of teams
attempting replication, our non-scientist participants may have
more confidence in the findings reported in Experiment 3.
We predicted that there will be no difference in attitude as
a function of the form in which the natural frequency data is
presented (Arabic numerals vs. words) (H4). If this is the case,
then the data from the 0/none and 10/all conditions can be
combined and analyzed along with the other four conditions.
If the form in which the numeric data is presented does
impact attitude, however, then those conditions must be analyzed
separately.
Methods
Participants
Two hundred undergraduate students enrolled in psychology
courses volunteered to participate. Data from 14 participants
were excluded because of failure to answer all the items in the
questionnaire and/or failure to follow instructions. One hundred
and twenty-seven of the remaining 186 participants were female.
The age range for the sample was 18–55 and the average age
was 22.4. Fifty-seven participants were students enrolled at a
private liberal arts college, 124 were enrolled at a community
college, and 5 participants did not indicate the institution they
were attending. All participants were given extra-credit in their
psychology courses as compensation.
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TABLE 4 | Mean and standard deviation of difference scores for
Experiment 3.
Replication rate Positive frame M(SD) Negative frame M(SD)
2 of 10 −0.807 (1.42)* −0.764 (1.3)*
4 of 10 −0.453 (1.26)* −0.387 (1.27)*
6 of 10 0.281 (1.28) −0.572 (1.27)*
8 of 10 0.264 (1.59) −0.045 (1.39)
*Indicates value that is significantly different from zero.
Stimuli and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure of Experiments 3 were identical
to Experiment 1 with several exceptions. All participants in
Experiment 3 completed an on-line questionnaire generated
by Opinio. Additionally, the replication rate information was
presented in the form of natural frequencies, rather than
percentages. In all cases, the additional information indicated
that 10 studies had been conducted in an attempt to replicate a
key study upon which the initial claim was based. Questionnaires
presenting replication rate information in a positive frame
employed six different ratios (0 of 10, 2 of 10, 4 of 10, 6 of
10, 8 of 10, and 10 of 10) specifying the number of studies
that successfully replicated a finding. Questionnaires presenting
replication rate information in a negative frame employed six
different ratios (10 of 10, 8 of 10, 6 of 10, 4 of 10, 2 of 10, and
0 of 10) specifying the number of studies that failed to replicate
a finding. The wording in some items was slightly altered in
order to accommodate the change from percentages to natural
frequencies (see Tables S4, S5). For some of the conditions (i.e.,
2 of 10, 4 of 10, 6 of 10, and 8 of 10) natural frequencies were
always presented with Arabic numerals. For the 0 of 10 and 10 of
10 conditions, however, Arabic numerals (e.g., 0 of 10) were used
for some items while words (e.g., none of the 10) were used for
other items.
Results and Discussion
Analysis of Conditions Only Using Natural
Frequencies
Descriptive statistics for Experiment 3 are presented in Table 4
and the pattern of data for Experiment 3 is also presented
graphically in Figure 3. Four levels of replication rate (2, 4, 6,
and 8 out of 10) were always presented with Arabic numerals.
In the 10 of 10 and 0 of 10 conditions, however, half of the items
were presented with Arabic numerals (10, 0) while the rest were
presented with the equivalent words (all, none). Therefore, the
conditions that included two different kinds of stimuli to indicate
natural frequencies were analyzed separately using independent
samples t-tests and the descriptive statistics for these conditions
are summarized in Table 5.
To analyze these four levels of replication rate, a 2 × 4 mixed
factorial ANOVA considering frame (positive, negative) as the
between-subjects factor and replication rate (2 of 10, 4 of 10, 6
of 10, 8 of 10) as the within-subjects factor revealed a significant
effect of frame, F(1, 184) = 4.76, p = 0.03, η
2
p = 0.025, and a
significant main effect of replication rate, F(3, 552) = 17.9, p <
FIGURE 3 | Difference score as a function of frame for Experiment 3.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
0.001, η2p = 0.09. There was also an interaction between frame
and replication rate, F(3, 552) = 5.61, p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.03. An
examination of the means revealed that the frame effect was most
pronounced when the replication rate was 6 out of 10. However,
the effect size associated with this interaction was weak and
therefore the interaction may not have any practical meaning.
Further analysis of the main effect of replication rate revealed a
significant linear trend, F(1, 184) = 40.2, p< 0.001, η
2
p = 0.179.
Though the ANOVA revealed both a significant main effect of
frame and a significant interaction between frame and replication
rate, the related effect sizes were much smaller than the effect size
of the framing effect seen in Experiments 1 and 2. Due to the large
n of the study and the relatively small effect sizes, we consider the
statistically significant results to have little practical significance.
Analysis of Conditions Using Natural Frequencies
and Arabic Numerals
As noted above, in two levels of replication rate (0 of 10; 10 of
10) some questionnaire items included Arabic numerals (10, 0)
while others included the equivalent words (all, none). Therefore,
these conditions were analyzed separately using independent
samples t-tests and the descriptive statistics for these conditions
are summarized in Table 5. In three of the four comparisons
(positive frame, 0 of 10, 10 of 10; negative frame, 10 of 10)
the Arabic numeral version was significantly different form the
equivalent information presented with a word (p < 0.045 in all
cases). The results of the independent samples t-tests justify our
omission of the 10 of 10 and 0 of 10 conditions from the earlier
analysis of variance.
Perhaps more interesting than the results of the independent
samples t-tests, however, were the distributions of difference
scores in the 0 of 10 replication rate conditions (see the
“distribution” column in Table 5). Note that two out of four of
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TABLE 5 | Descriptive statistics for the 0 of 10 and 10 of 10 replication rate conditions of Experiment 3.
Frame Replication rate Stimuli n M(SD) Distribution
Positive 0 of 10 succeed* 0 45 −1.642 (1.59) Unimodal
None 44 −1.017 (1.29) Bimodal with peaks at 0.5 and −1.5
10 of 10 succeed 10 56 0.667 (1.45) Unimodal
All 33 0.821 (1.67) Unimodal
Negative 0 of 10 succeed* 10 61 −1.754 (1.21) Bimodal with peaks at 2 and −2
All 36 −1.065 (1.53) Flat from −0.5 to 2.5
10 of 10 Succeed* 0 60 −0.623 (1.76) Unimodal
None 37 0.200 (1.73) Unimodal
*Indicates significant difference at 0.05 level.
these conditions were characterized by bimodal distributions.
Before going on, it should be noted that none of the 2, 4, 6,
or 8 out of 10 conditions of Experiment 3 were characterized
by bimodal distributions, nor were any of the condition in
Experiments 1a, 1b, or 2. The statements associated with
bimodal distributions included “none of the 10 succeeded in
replicating” (positive frame) and “10/all of 10 failed to replicate”
(negative frame). Note that the only condition containing a
double negative “0/none of 10 failed to replicate” (negative
frame) was characterized by a unimodal distribution. The pattern
of unimodal and bimodal distributions further justifies our
omission of the 10 of 10 and 0 of 10 conditions from the earlier
ANOVA.
In Experiment 3, as in Experiments 1 and 2, there was
an effect of replication rate, characterized by a strong linear
trend, (H1) and an effect of frame (H2). Unlike the previous
experiments, however, the effect of frame in Experiment 3 was
much weaker and therefore might have little practical relevance.
The smaller magnitude of the framing effect in Experiment
3 appears to lend some support our prediction that natural
frequencies would be associated with an attenuated framing effect
(H3). The significant main effect of replication rate ruled out
the possibility that participant attitude was only influenced by
set size. However, we cannot determine if participants were
influenced by the ratio between the subset and the entire set
or if they were influenced only by the size of the subset. In
either case, one would expect to see a strong linear trend of
replication rate.
EXPERIMENT 4
In Experiment 3, participants were always informed that 10
research teams had attempted to replicate each finding. The
results of Experiment 3 differed from Experiments 1 in 2 in that
they did not reveal a strong framing effect. The lack of framing
effect in Experiment 3 may be an artifact due to the specific
natural frequencies employed. In Experiment 4, participants
were informed that 5, not 10, research teams attempted to
replicate each finding. Experiment 4 has the potential to confirm
the attenuated framing effect (H3) seen in Experiment 3.
Additionally, Experiment 4 may confirm the unexpected pattern
of results found in the 0 of 10 and 10 of 10 conditions of
Experiment 3 (H4).
Methods
Participants
One hundred and ninety-six undergraduate students enrolled
in psychology courses volunteered to participate. Data from 20
participants were excluded because of failure to answer all the
items in the questionnaire and/or failure to follow instructions.
One hundred and twenty-seven of the remaining 177 participants
were female. The age range for the sample was 18–55 and the
average age was 26.3. Five participants were students enrolled at
a private liberal arts college, 166 were enrolled at a community
college, and 5 participants did not indicate the institution they
were attending. All participants were given extra credit in their
psychology courses as compensation.
Stimuli and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure of Experiments 4 was identical
to Experiment 3 with several exceptions. In all cases, the
additional information indicated that five studies had attempted
to replicate a key study upon which the initial claim was
based. Questionnaires presenting replication rate information in
a positive frame employed six different ratios (0 of 5, 1 of 5, 2
of 5, 3 of 5, 4 of 5, and 5 of 5) specifying the number of studies
that successfully replicated a finding. Questionnaires presenting
replication rate information in a negative frame employed six
different ratios (5 of 5, 4 of 5, 3 of 5, 2 of 5, 1 of 5, and 0
of 5) specifying the number of studies that failed to replicate a
finding. As with Experiment 3, words were substituted for Arabic
numerals for some items (H4). The Experiment 4 substitutions
occurred in the same places as the substitutions of Experiment 3
(see Tables S4, S5).
Results and Discussion
Analysis of Conditions Only Using Natural
Frequencies
Descriptive statistics for the 1 of 5, 2 of 5, 3 of 5, and 4 of 5
conditions, in which natural frequencies were always presented
with Arabic numerals, are presented in Table 6 and the pattern of
data for these conditions is also presented graphically in Figure 4.
A 2 × 4 mixed factorial ANOVA considering frame (positive,
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TABLE 6 | Mean and standard deviation of difference scores for
Experiment 4.
Replication rate Positive frame M(SD) Negative frame M(SD)
1 of 5 −0.527 (1.29)* −0.955 (1.43)*
2 of 5 −0.176 (1.33) −0.705 (1.26)*
3 of 5 0.305 (1.31) −0.613 (1.40)*
4 of 5 0.304 (1.50) −0.035 (1.54)
*Indicates value that is significantly different from zero.
FIGURE 4 | Difference score as a function of frame for Experiment 4.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
negative) as the between-subjects factor and replication rate (1
of 5, 2 of 5, 3 of 5, 4 of 5) as the within-subjects factor revealed
a significant main effect of frame, F(1, 175) = 19, p < 0.001, η
2
p =
0.098, and a significant main effect of replication rate, F(3, 525) =
15.5, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.081. There was no interaction between
frame and replication rate, F(3, 525) = 1.78, p > 0.15, η
2
p = 0.01.
Further analysis of the main effect of replication rate indicated a
significant linear trend, F(1, 175) = 40.1, p< 0.001, η
2
p = 0.187.
Analysis of Conditions Using Natural Frequencies
and Arabic numerals
In the 5 of 5 and 0 of 5 conditions some items included Arabic
numerals (0, 5) while others included the equivalent words
(none, all). These conditions were analyzed separately using
independent samples t-tests and the descriptive statistics are
summarized in Table 7. No significant differences were found
between the Arabic numeral and words in any of the conditions
(p > 0.09 in all cases). In contrast to Experiment 3, the results
of the independent samples t-tests do not appear to justify our
omission of the 5 of 5 and 0 of 5 conditions from the earlier
analysis of variance.
The pattern of distributions for the four conditions do,
however, justify the omission of the 0 of 5 and 5 of 5 conditions
from the 2 × 4 mixed factorial ANOVA of the Experiment 4
difference scores. For the replication rate of 0 of 5 there were
four conditions (positive Arabic, negative Arabic, positive word,
negative word) and three of these conditions were characterized
by bimodal distributions (the fourth was characterized by a flat
distribution). This is in contrast to the 1 of 5, 2 of 5, 3 of 5, 4 of 5,
and 5 of 5 conditions of Experiment 4 that were not characterized
by bimodal or flat distributions. In a pattern similar to that
found in Experiment 3, the statements associated with bimodal
distributions included “0/none of the 5 succeeded in replicating”
(positive frame) and “5/all of 5 failed to replicate” (negative
frame). As in Experiment 3, the only condition containing a
double negative “0/none of 5 failed to replicate” (negative frame)
was characterized by a unimodal distribution. These results
indicate that the findings of Experiment 3 were not a fluke:
the manner in which natural frequencies are presented (Arabic
numerals vs. words) does make a difference to participants.
Experiments 3 and 4 Compared to Experiments 1
and 2
The results of Experiment 3 indicate that a much smaller framing
effect obtained when natural frequencies were employed. A
statistically significant and practically meaningful framing effect
was found in Experiment 4; however, this effect was smaller than
that found in either Experiments 1 or 2. Though the effect size of
framing was much larger when the replication rate information
was presented in the form of percentages, it is clear that the use
of natural frequencies does not actually eliminate the effect.
EXPERIMENT 5
Experiments 1 through 4 provided a great deal of information in
regards to how attitude is affected by replication rate information,
however, there are two limitations of Experiments 1 through 4.
These experiments do not demonstrate that the effects would also
obtain in tasks employing choice as the dependent measure, nor
do they rule out the possibility that the effects might be due to
participants being presented with different percentages within
the same questionnaire. Regarding the first point: although
Kahneman et al. (1999) have argued that the willingness to pay
(a decision-based dependent measure) is appropriately viewed
as equivalent to an expression of attitude, we cannot be certain
that the findings of Experiments 1 through 4 will generalize
to a task that relies on choice as a dependent measure. The
main variables employed in the first four experiments [replication
rate, frame (positive, negative), and numeric format (percentage,
natural frequency)] were included in Experiment 5. Participants
in Experiment 5 were not asked for their attitude in regards
to a science claim, however. Instead they were presented with
evidence for and against a pair of prescription drugs that could
be used to treat the same symptoms. After reading about the two
drugs, participants indicated which of the two drugs they would
choose in order to treat these symptoms.
It is our hypothesis that participants will be more likely to
choose a particular drug if positive findings in regards to this are
associated with a large replication rate (H1) and if the replication
rate is framed in a positive manner (H2). We also predict that
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TABLE 7 | Descriptive statistics for the 0 of 5 and 5 of 5 replication rate conditions of Experiment 4.
Frame Replication rate Stimuli n M(SD) Distribution
Positive 0 of 5 succeed 0 47 −1.202 (1.42) Bimodal with peaks at 0 and −2.5
None 40 −1.196 (1.44) Flat from −3 to −0.5
5 of 5 succeed 5 56 0.800 (1.58) Unimodal
All 31 0.189 (1.64) Unimodal
Negative 0 of 5 succeed 5 60 −1.596(1.4) Bimodal with peaks at −2.5 and 2.5
All 30 −1.095(1.75) Bimodal with peaks at −2.5 and 0.5
5 of 5 Succeed 0 57 −0.701(1.65) Unimodal
None 33 −0.152(2.12) Unimodal
the framing effect will be larger in the percentage conditions as
compared to the natural frequency conditions (H3).
Methods
Participants
Participants were 458 students enrolled at a community college
and 204 college students enrolled at a state university. All
students received extra-credit in their psychology courses for
their participation. Four hundred and sixty-four participants
were female; the age range for the sample was 18–60 and the
average age was 24.1.
Stimuli and Procedure
All community college participants completed an on-line
questionnaire created using Opinio software. Participants at the
state university completed the same questionnaire on paper. All
participants read the following scenario about two drugs:
“Assume that you have just visited your physician where you
learned that you suffer from very high blood pressure. Your
physician is willing to write out a prescription for one of two drugs
to treat high blood pressure: Ansulfazor or Trocamazor.
You know this about Ansulfazor: An experiment conducted
by Dr. Howel revealed that Ansulfazor was slightly more effective
than Trocamazor, but Ansuulfazor had somewhat more side-
effects than Trocamazor.
You know this about Trocamazor: An experiment conducted
by Dr. Simonson indicated that Trocamazor was much more
effective than Ansulfazor.”
A final sentence always followed the information presented
above. There were 12 versions of this final sentence and they
differed in terms of replication rate (8%, 43%, 81%, 92%, 4 of
10, 2 of 5) and frame (positive, negative). Each participant was
presented with only 1 of the 12 variations, as Experiment 5 was a
completely between-subjects design. The sentence included in the
43% replication rate condition surveys was, “Additionally, 43%
of the researchers who tried to replicate Dr. Simonson’s findings
succeeded in doing so.” The wording for the other 11 conditions
can be found in Table S6.
Participants were asked to imagine that they had to choose
one of these two drugs and then indicate the one that they
would choose (this constituted the sole dependent measure).
Once participants indicated their choice (or clicked “next” to
move to the next screen) they were presented with a series
of demographic questions identical to those in Experiments
3 and 4.
Results
Descriptive statistics for Experiment 5 are presented in Table 8
and a summary of chi-squared analyses for Experiment 5 are
presented in Table 9. Chi-squared tests revealed a significant
framing effect for five of the six replication rate conditions
(p < 0.001 in all five cases). The framing effect was not
significant in the 8% replication rate condition, although
the data were in the predicted direction. The significant
results for the natural frequency conditions indicate that,
in tasks in which choice serves as the dependent measure,
framing effects are not attenuated when the replication
rate information is communicated in terms of natural
frequency.
A series of chi-squared analyses were conducted to explore
the possibility that the choice task used in Experiment 5 would
reveal replication rate effects. These analyses were not conducted
on the natural frequency conditions of Experiment 5, as the
two conditions (4 of 10, 2 of 5) contain the same replication
rate information. For the positive frame, percentage replication
rate conditions, all replication rates were compared to all the
other replication rates using individual chi-squared tests. The
data from all comparisons of the positively framed data were in
a direction consistent with a replication rate effect, though not
all comparisons reached statistical significance. All comparisons
were significant at the 0.05 level (p-values ranged from <0.001
to 0.04) except for three. The 43 vs. 92% comparison did not
quite reach the 0.05 level (p = 0.06). Additionally, the 43
vs. 81% and the 81 vs. 92% comparisons were non-significant
(p = 0.17 and 0.6 respectively). Chi-squared tests were also
used to determine if similar replication rate effects were found
for the negative frame, percentage replication rate conditions.
In contrast to the analyses of the positive frame condition, no
significant effects of replication rate were found in the negative
frame condition (p-values ranged from 0.24 to 0.93), however.
It may be that the negative frame wording in the choice task
was so confusing that participants simply chose an option at
random.
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TABLE 8 | Descriptive statistics for Experiment 5: percentage of sample
favoring each drug as a function of replication rate and frame.
Replication rate (%) Frame Drug choice
Ansulfazor Trocamazor
8 Positive 38 (19) 62 (31)
Negative 46 (22) 54 (26)
43 Positive 20 (11) 80 (45)
Negative 57 (33) 43 (25)
81 Positive 10 (5) 90 (45)
Negative 51 (31) 49 (30)
92 Positive 7 (4) 93 (50)
Negative 58 (30) 42 (22)
2 of 5 Positive 19 (10) 81 (43)
Negative 54 (34) 46 (29)
4 of 10 Positive 18 (11) 82 (51)
Negative 64 (35) 36 (20)
Values in parentheses are cell sample sizes.
TABLE 9 | Summary of chi-squared analyses for Experiment 5.
Comparison Statistic
8% positive vs. 8% negative χ2 (1, n = 97) = 0.62, p = 0.43
43% positive vs. 43% negative χ2 (1, n = 114) = 16.7, p < 0.001
81% positive vs. 81% negative χ2 (1, n = 111) = 20.9, p < 0.001
92% positive vs. 92% negative χ2 (1, n = 105) = 30.7, p < 0.001
2 of 5 positive vs. 2 of 5 negative χ2 (1, n = 116) = 15.1, p < 0.001
4 of 10 positive vs. 4 of 10 negative χ2 (1, n = 117) = 25.7, p < 0.001
8% positive vs. 43% positive χ2 (1, n = 105) = 4.4, p = 0.04
8% positive vs. 81% positive χ2 (1, n = 99) = 10.8, p = 0.001
8% positive vs. 92% positive χ2 (1, n = 103) = 14.1, p < 0.001
43% positive vs. 81% positive χ2 (1, n = 105) = 1.9, p = 0.17
43% positive vs. 92% positive χ2 (1, n = 109) = 3.5, p = 0.06
81% positive vs. 92% positive χ2 (1, n = 103) = 0.2, p = 0.64
8% negative vs. 43% negative χ2 (1, n = 105) = 1.3, p = 0.26
8% negative vs. 81% negative χ2 (1, n = 108) = 0.27, p = 0.67
8% negative vs. 92% negative χ2 (1, n = 99) = 1.4, p = 0.24
43% negative vs. 81% negative χ2 (1, n = 118) = 0.4, p = 0.51
43% negative vs. 92% negative χ2 (1, n = 109) < 0.01, p = 0.93
81% negative vs. 92% negative χ2 (1, n = 112) = 0.5, p = 0.47
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of five studies generally supported three of our four
hypotheses. Our samples of college students and members of
the general public responded to replication rate information
in a sensible fashion: the lower the replication rate of a study
the less favorable attitudes toward a claim based on that study
(H1). There was an even stronger effect of framing, however:
participants had more favorable attitudes toward science claims
when the replication rate was framed in a positive, rather
than a negative, fashion (H2). The framing effect found in the
studies employing attitude difference as a dependentmeasure was
replicated in a study in which choice served as the dependent
measure. The sensitivity to replication rate was found regardless
of whether the replication rate was presented as a percentage or
a natural frequency. Based on effect size, x-intercept values, and
themean values of the positive and negative frame conditions, the
framing effect appeared to bemore pronounced in the percentage
experiments than in the two natural frequency experiments (H3).
While this suggests the possibility that the framing effect might
be attenuated when replication rate information is presented in
natural frequency format, we found no support for H3 when
choice served as the dependent measure. Finally, results of
Experiments 3 and 4 indicated that the format that the natural
frequencies were presented in (words vs. numbers) did have an
impact on subjects, and this finding was evidence against H4.
The examples employed in the questionnaires involved
natural rather than social science claims. We do not know if our
hypotheses would have been supported if we had employed social
science claims in lieu of natural science claims. Additionally, the
results of the current studies cannot be compared to an objective
benchmark. We don’t know the “right” or “rational” amount that
attitude regarding a science claim ought to be altered in the face of
information about replication rate. So while the results may speak
to such issues as how non-scientists are influenced by framing
and replication rate information, the results can’t tell us whether-
or-not the participants were being influenced in the “correct”
fashion.
When replication rate information was presented in natural
frequency format (Experiments 3 and 4) both the number
of attempted replications and the quantity of the subset of
the sample that succeeded/failed to replicate the finding were
available. In responding to science claims paired with replication
rate information presented in a natural frequency format,
participants could use (A) both pieces of information, (B) neither
piece of information, (C) the quantity of the subset only, or (D)
the number of attempted replications only. The strong effect
of replication rate in both experiments ruled out options B
and D. Because we could not run statistical analyses comparing
Experiments 3 and 4, we cannot rule out option C. However, we
feel that the data better support option A; that participant attitude
was influenced by the ratio between replications and attempted
replications as the most likely factor influencing participant
opinion.
The presence of a strong framing effect in all five studies
is consistent with the findings of most studies involving what
Levin et al. (1998) refer to as attribution frames. The general
finding of these studies is that a particular alternative is rated
more favorably when described positively than when described
negatively. Experiments 1 through 4 extended previous research
on this topic by allowing us to compare effect size of framing with
effect size of replication rate. We not only have demonstrated
that framing is more influential than replication rate, we have
shown how much more influential it is. Given our results, one
could predict that a U.S. adult who read a New York Times
article claiming that 10% of the attempted replications of study X
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have failed to replicate the finding, would have the same attitude
about study X as a similar individual who read a Wall Street
Journal article claiming that 45% of the attempted replications
of study X have been successful. Studies 1 through 4 indicate
that a scientist or science journalist communicating to members
of the general public may be able to minimize the impact
of framing by communicating replication rate information as
natural frequencies rather than percentages.
On the one hand, the results of our attitude experiments
suggest that natural frequencies are associated with an attenuated
framing effect. On the other hand, there was not any evidence
that natural frequencies attenuate the framing effect in the
choice tasks. Even in the tasks using attitude as a dependent
measure, there was still a significant framing effect in the natural
frequencies conditions and the difference in the magnitude of the
framing effect between the percentage and the natural frequencies
conditions was not large.
Although there is a long and rich tradition exploring the
manner in which individuals use and respond to qualitative
probability expressions and quantitative probability values
(Toogood, 1980; Beyth-Marom, 1982; Nakao and Axelrod, 1983;
Budescu and Wallsten, 1985; Mosteller and Youtz, 1990), the
literature is silent in regards to the impact of using Arabic
numerals or equivalent words in natural frequency expressions
(e.g., 5 of 5 vs. all of 5). The finding in Experiment 3 that the
impact of some natural frequency expressions was influenced
by the manner in which the quantity of the subcategory was
described (Arabic numeral vs. word) was unexpected and difficult
to integrate with the literature on natural frequencies. The effect
was not replicated in Experiment 4 (although the trends were in
the same direction) so it is difficult to interpret the findings.
Even though framing effects are usually established in studies
employing choices or decisions as dependent measures, we relied
primarily on tasks involving attitude as the dependent measure.
In the one experiment in which choice served as the dependent
measure (Experiment 5), we replicated the framing effect and
partially replicated the replication rate effect. Both the attitude
and choice tasks indicated that framing is more important than
replication rate. Kahneman et al. (1999) developed an argument
that patterns of results found in tasks employing the dependent
measures of choice and contingent valuation (CVM) ought to be
found in tasks using attitude as a dependent measure. Kahneman
et al. (1999) claimed that choice is a special case of comparative
valuation and argue that attitude and CVM responses are highly
correlated and that the same things that affect dollar valuations
(frames, anchors, etc.) tend to also affect attitudes as well (see
also Kahneman and Ritov, 1994; Kahneman et al., 1998; Payne
et al., 1999). The fact that we partially replicated the results of
experiments 1–4 with a study employing choice as the dependent
measure is consistent with the perspective of Kahneman et al.
(1999).
The current studies found that agreement with a claim
increases with the percentage of researchers who replicate
(and thus agree with) the claim. The results of the current
studies have so far been discussed terms of JDM and science
communication. However, social learning researchers have found
empirical evidence of learning through strategies that include
“copy the majority” (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Pike and
Laland, 2010) and “copy the behavior with the highest absolute
number of demonstrators” (Bond, 2005). To the degree that
attitude change is related to behavioral change, the replication
rate effect in the present studies might suggest a way to
form a bridge between JDM and social learning approaches.
The results of the current studies are consistent with past
studies that have explored attribute framing, but the current
studies are unique in that they demonstrate an effect of
framing upon interpretations of a given replication rate and
do so using both attitude and choice as dependent measures.
There are important practical implications of the rather large
framing effect shown in these studies. Scientists, politicians,
policy makers, journalists, corporations, and think tanks use
scientific findings in order to influence public opinion about
a wide range of critical issues. The current studies indicate
that non-scientists are strongly influenced by knowledge of
replication, and the studies also illustrate that the framing of
the replication rate of a given scientific finding is an important
tool that communicators can exploit. In fact, the current
results suggest that public opinion in regards to an issue such
as global warming may be influenced just as much by the
empirical findings, as by the manner in which the findings are
framed.
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